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INTRODUCTION

A pathway to permanent residence or citizenship for undocumented
immigrants has been a linchpin of the contemporary United States
immigration debate and remains a hot-button political issue for everyday
Americans.' While popular support for such pathways has generally
increased,2 pockets of acute opposition to such pathways have only
polarized.3 Meanwhile, policy think tanks across the political spectrum
1.

See,

e.g.,

IPSOS,

THOMSON

REUTERS,

CORE

POL.

DATA

(2019),

https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2019-06/2019_reuters_tracking
-_corepolitical_2020_democraticprimary tracker_06_06_2019_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UL7L-C927] (finding that polling showed immigration tied with healthcare as the most
important problem facing the U.S. today); MONMOUTH UNIV. POLLING INST., MONMOUTH
UNIV.,

NATIONAL:

PUBLIC

WANTS

GOP

TO

WORK

WITH

BIDEN

(2021),

https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-institute/documents/monmouthpollus_012721.pdf
[https://perma.cc/64J7-VCUR] (finding that seventy-one percent of Americans view
immigration as "very important" or "extremely important" for the federal government to
address).
2. See, e.g., Victoria Balara, Fox News Poll:83 percent support pathway to
citizenshipfor illegal immigrants, Fox NEWS (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.foxnews.com/
politics/fox-news-poll-september-28-2017 [https://perma.cc/6HC6-G6QM]; TIM MALLOY
DOUG SCHWARTZ, QUINNIPIAC UNIV., 61% OPTIMISTIC ABOUT NEXT FOUR YEARS WITH
BIDEN IN OFFICE, QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY NATIONAL POLL FINDS; 68% OF AMERICANS
SUPPORT

THE

$1.9

TRILLION

STIMULUS

RELIEF

BILL

(2021),

https://poll.qu.edu/

images/polling/us/us02032021_uszn68.pdf [https://perma.cc/EU8B-YZGY] (reporting that
eighty-three percent of those polled support a pathway to citizenship for undocumented
immigrants).
3.

See, e.g., EMILY EKINS & DAVID KEMP, CATO INST., E PLURIBUS UNUM: FINDINGS

FROM THE CATO INSTITUTE 2021 IMMIGRATION AND IDENTITY NATIONAL SURVEY (2021),
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have put their thumbs on the scale with their own conceptions of pathways
or the complete lack thereof 4
An immigration pathway has permeated many serious attempts at
both comprehensive and piecemeal federal reform.5 Well-meaning but
eventually ill-fated attempts at grand legislative fixes to an immigration law
system, whose last serious overhaul was in 1996, still reinforce this
common theme.6 On the other hand, states fed up with congressional
inaction and under-resourced, ineffective, federal enforcement boldly take
steps to discourage the continued presence of undocumented immigrants,
preventing any sort of progress towards an immigration "pathway."7
The most applicable plain meaning definition of "pathway" or
"path"eventually directs us to the notion of a "course": movement in a path
"from point to point," or "an ordered process of succession." Immigration
law scholars have astutely commented on the "pathway" concept in both

https://www.cato.org/survey-reports/e-pluribus-unum-findings-cato-institute-2021-immigrati
on-identity-national-survey [https://perma.cc/G4D9-KNPB] (noting greater Republican
support for harsh immigration positions, such as stripping birthright citizenship from
children born to undocumented immigrants in the U.S., tightening restrictions for
immigrants to receive welfare and government assistance, and deporting legal immigrants
who dislike America or believe America is a racist country).
4. See, e.g., Brian Tashman & Naureen Shah, The Time Is Now: Congress Must Pass
Citizenship Legislation, ACLU (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants[https://perma.cc/8UY4-2
rights/the-time-is-now-congress-must-pass-citizenship-legislation
422]; MUZAFFAR CHISHTI, JULIA GELATT & DORIS MEISSNER, MIGRATION POL'Y INST.,
RETHINKING THE U.S. LEGAL IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: A POLICY ROAD MAP (2021),

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/Rethinking-LegalImmigratio
n-RoadmapFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZGU7-4QTD]; ALEX NOWRASTEH & DAVID J.
BIER, CATO INST., THREE NEW WAYS FOR CONGRESS TO LEGALIZE ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

(2019),

https://www.cato.org/immigration-research-policy-brief/three-new-ways-congress-

legalize-illegal-immigrants [https://perma.cc/VWY4-HBWT]; cf CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD.,
HIRE AMERICAN: 20 PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO REDUCE WORK VISAS AND PERMITS

(2020), https://cis.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/hire-american-5-20

0.pdf

[https://perma.cc/

F66G-WW3T].
5. See, e.g., Michelle Hackman & Tarini Parti, Democrats Consider Piecemeal
Approach to Immigration Bills, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/democrats-consider-piecemeal-approach-to-immigration-bills-11613656888?page=1
[https://perma.cc/4JWJ-A9WF].
6. See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S.1348, 110th Cong.
(2007); Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,
S.744, 113th Cong. (2013); Reforming American Immigration for Strong Employment Act,

S.354, 115th Cong., (2017); Dream Act of 2021, S.264, 117th Cong. (2021).

7.
See, e.g., S.B. 1070, 2010 Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (state law creating a
misdemeanor infraction for an undocumented immigrant who applies for or solicits work,
and that permits warrantless arrests of any individuals whom a state officer has probable
cause to believe is removable); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 21, 2006) (local law
fining landlords for renting to undocumented immigrants and suspending licenses of
business who employ undocumented immigrants).
8. Pathway, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/course [https://perma.cc/QLP2-HND8] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).

2022]

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR MODELS

537

normative and granular strokes. 9 They have expressed understandable
discomfort with the entire notion of an earned grant of permanent residence
or citizenship as an exacerbation of pre-existing hardship, systemic racism,
and the pernicious consequences of American intervention. 0 However, they
have also acknowledged the political reality that a pathway of several steps,
rather than envisioning permanent residence or citizenship as a light switch
to turn on, or a binary pole jump from the "zero" of undocumented status to
the "one" of a better stage, is necessary to ensure long-delayed legislative
reform comes to fruition, even as they persuasively argue for a larger array
of guideposts in its construction." Regardless of their normative stances on
a pathway, they all agree that the productive discussion of one will require
more than the binary characterization of the have-nots (those without legal
status under United States immigration law) and the future haves (those
with permanent residence and citizenship). 1 2
It is from these guideposts that this Article takes its cues. Part I
begins with a necessary threshold task: attempting to create a working
definition of immigration pathway. This task builds on the work of a
previous scholarly attempt to state plainly what the elements of that
definition might be.1 3 Part I posits that this working definition contains four
elements. The first two-actions and time-seem self-evident from
political discourse, past and ongoing attempts at comprehensive
immigration reform, and scholarship alike. This Article also notes that
actions required by a pathway can be subdivided into public actions and
private ones, and that such a division foreshadows the critical role private
behavior plays in a pathway. However, the last two-progression and

9.
David J. Bier, Reforming the Immigration System: A Brief Outline, CATO INST.
(Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.cato.org/study/reforming-immigration-system-brief-outline#
illegal-immigrants-us-system [https://perma.cc/4L5S-Q6WC].

10.

See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION BLUEPRINT FOR A FAIR,

ORDERLY AND HUMANE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM (2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2021/07/27/fact-sheet-the-biden-administration-blueprint-for-a-fair
-orderly-and-humane-immigration-system/ [https://perma.cc/7QBN-BYB2]; Romelia M.
Solano, Biden is pursuinga pathway to citizenship. He will face two key challenges., WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/29/biden-ispursuing-pathway-citizenship-he-will-face-two-key-challenges/
[https://perma.cc/SYK2-9A

5W].
11. See, e.g., Tom Jawetz, Restoring the Rule of Law Through a Fair, Humane, and
Workable Immigration System, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 22, 2019, 4:45 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2019/07/22/472378/restoringrule-law-fair-humane-workable-immigration-system/ [https://perma.cc/7HB2-CL96].
12. See, e.g., Rose Cuison Villazor, American Nationals and Interstitial Citizenship,
85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1673, 1675 (2017).
13. Richard T. Middleton IV, Comprehensive US. Immigration Reform: Policy
Innovation or Nondecisions, 38 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 313 (2014) (proposing a six-element
characterization of the pathway to citizenship as delineated in the "Bipartisan Framework for
Comprehensive Immigration Reform," drafted by eight United States senators in 2013, while
offering a policy innovation-based critique of it).
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protection-are what truly make a pathway, as opposed to an unhelpful
binary.
Part II suggests that the utility of this working definition is most
evident when examining the current system of employment-based
immigration in the United States. Policy insight on this tangled web of
nonimmigrant and immigrant visa categories has been robust, particularly
within the immigration practitioner bar itself. 4 Political sentiment likewise
runs hot even for this class of "legal" immigrants, although the concerted
advocacy of corporate interests has been an intriguing counterweight to the
traditional political divide on immigration.' 5 Yet actual legal scholarship on
this important niche of immigration law practice is quite scarce. In
beginning to remedy that deficit, this Article argues that employment-based
immigration-and specifically a critique of its existing ineffective pathways
(and non-pathways) for immigrant entrepreneurs, small business owners,
and investors-proves the utility of the working definition established by
Part I. This Article acknowledges that these immigrants benefit from a
significantly higher degree of economic privilege, political privilege, and
existing options for legal status than their undocumented counterparts. Yet,
it is precisely the employment-based system's range of tenuous and robust
nonimmigrant and immigrant options that makes element-driven critiques
of its handling of politically favored immigrants instructive.
Part III adds to this discussion by building on Part I's earlier
identification of private actions as being integral to an immigration
pathway. It does so by telling an important story about a specific private
pathway that the global entrepreneur and direct investment communities
have attempted to build between the disparate nonimmigrant and immigrant
categories under United States immigration law. In particular, Part III
describes the citizenship-by-investment ("CBI") bridge route as an antidote
to the public (United States immigration) pathway's failure to allow many
immigrant entrepreneurs, small business owners, and investors to begin
their path to permanent residence in a lawful, nonimmigrant visa status.
Requiring an immigrant from a high-immigration country to first obtain
citizenship by individually investing in a third country that has a qualifying
treaty of commerce and navigation would allow the immigrant to attain the
necessary initial investor visa. At the same time, this practice would allow
growth and job creation in both the third country and the United States as a
condition of the attainment of permanent residence. This ingenious solution
devised by the private sector exploits the comparatively better pathway in a

14.

See

JEB BUSH, THOMAS F. MCLARTY

III & EDWARD

ALDEN, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN

RELS., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 91-92 (2009), https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_

pdf/ImmigrationTFR63.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB7A-VWKX].
15. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. WOODWELL, JR., CARNEGIE CORP. OF N.Y., BUILDING
BRIDGES ON IMMIGRATION 3-4 (2021), https://media.carnegie.org/filerpublic/7b/b7/7bb79a

44-146e-4666-bl37-9e021358048b/alliancebuilding reportfin.pdf
M-MAVS].

[https://perma.cc/68T
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third country and uses it to remedy the ineffective public one in United
States employment-based immigration law. As such, it provides an
additional critique of the current pathways for immigrant entrepreneurs,
investors, and small business owners, while also providing a model private
pathway that could remedy, or perhaps even exist as, a parallel "express"
option to the public one broadly envisioned by United States immigration
law.
This Article concludes by suggesting the next steps for legislative
and executive measures that can build on the element-driven observations
in previous sections. It acknowledges how insights gleaned from the
proposed working definition of pathway can not only leverage the current
political climate and pandemic environment, but also provide a richer
understanding of community impact and equitable distribution of
immigration benefits. It notes normative considerations as to the desirability
of private pathway construction. Lastly, this Article's conclusion invites
further usage of the working definition of immigration pathway established
in Part I to critique other federal government programs that appear
pathway-like on their face, but may fail the four-element test in various
respects.
I.

FROM A BINARY UNDERSTANDING OF IMMIGRATION PATHWAY TO
A WORKING DEFINITION

A. The Problem of a Binary in Immigration Pathways
An immediate logical problem impedes a proper discussion about
immigration pathways-the difficulty of adjusting from an initial binary
framing as having a non-desirable and desirable pole. The non-desirable
end of the pathway most often refers to undocumented individuals in the
United States-those without temporary permission to remain,
nonimmigrant visa status, permanent residence, or citizenship.1 6 The
desirable end of the pathway refers to one of these latter two forms of legal
status: permanent residence or citizenship.' 7 It more commonly refers to the
latter, given the protections from the grounds of inadmissibility and
deportability that United States citizens enjoy.18

16. See Why Don't Immigrants Apply for Citizenship?: There Is No Line for Many
Undocumented
Immigrants,
AM.
IMMIGR.
COUNCIL
(Oct.
7,
2021),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/whydont immigra
nts_apply forcitizenshipO.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8YJ-KXWA] [hereinafter Why Don't
Immigrants Apply for Citizenship?].
17. 4 Paths to Legal Status for Undocumented Immigrants, CITIZEN PATH (Oct. 13,
2020), https://citizenpath.com/paths-to-legal-status-undocumented/ [https://perma.cc/2RM4-

WKQK].
18. See KATHERINE BRADY
GROUNDS OF DEPORTABILITY AND

&

DAN KESSELBRENNER, NAT'L IMMIGR. PROJECT,
INADMISSIBILITY RELATED TO CRIMES 1-2 (2012),

'
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Framing the immigration pathway as a mere binary is politically
inconvenient. Any number of critiques of either comprehensive or
piecemeal immigration reform strongly disapprove of immediate movement
between the non-desirable and desirable poles.1 9 Those who regard amnesty
or legalization programs as a giveaway are essentially also critiquing a
binary framing of the problem. From the other side of the immigration
debate, binary framing of the immigration pathway poses another risk, that
immediate movement from undocumented to permanent residence, or
citizenship, is a proxy for solving all the challenges that such noncitizens
face in the United States community.20 Such policy experts rightly note that
significant challenges as to the support and integration of immigrants
cannot be swept under the rug with an instantaneous grant of favorable
immigration status, nor will systematic racial or national origin
discrimination dissipate upon the conferral of a green card.2

https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/practice_advisories/crim/20
12_Octgrounds-deport-admiss.pdf [https://perma.cc/JBJ6-S4BZ].
19. See, e.g., No Amnesty Act, H.R. 2004, 117th Cong. (2021) (proposing to deny all
federal funding to enforcement of any executive branch policies reevaluating harms done to
undocumented immigrants generally and to applicants for asylum and refugee status
specifically); Stop Amnesty, NUMBERSUSA, https://www.numbersusa.com/solutions/stopamnesty [https://perma.cc/YH29-BPKT] (last visited Dec. 21, 2021) (opposing "any attempt
by the federal government to offer legal presence and work permits" to undocumented
immigrants); REPUBLICAN NAT'L COMM., REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016

25-26 (2016),
https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/docs/ResolutionPlatform_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4AL
-AZPQ] (only "embracing the newcomers legally among us" and opposing "any form of
amnesty"). The Republican National Committee declined to adopt a new platform in 2020,
effectively leaving the 2016 platform intact.
20. See, e.g., Giovanni Peri & Reem Zaiour, Citizenship for Undocumented
Immigrants Would Boost US. Economic Growth, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 14, 2021),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2021/06/14/500433/citizenshi
p-undocumented-immigrants-boost-u-s-economic-growth
[https://perma.cc/UME3-KL5C]
(analyzing economic growth as a result of immediate legalization reform while noting
important assumptions of post-legalization wage growth for undocumented immigrants).
21. See id; see also Peniel Ibe, Why we need a pathway to citizenship for all
immigrants, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM. (Sept. 2, 2021), https://www.afsc.org/blogs/newsand-commentary/why-we-need-pathway-to-citizenship-all-immigrants
[https://perma.cc/7A
GL-6Z7K] (advocating for a pathway to citizenship, but also ensuring family reunification,
full access to public benefits, and respect for human, civil, and labor rights for
undocumented immigrants, even after permanent residence and citizenship); Marshall Fitz,
The Promise of a Path to Citizenship: What It Means for Enforcement, EMERSON
COLLECTIVE, https://www.emersoncollective.com/the-promise-of-a-path-to-citizenship-what
-it-means-for-enforcement [https://perma.cc/Z4DK-ET43] (last visited Oct. 6, 2021) (noting
a pathway to citizenship would blunt enforcement practices overwhelmingly affecting Black
and Brown communities, and characterizing such a development as "interrupting" cycles of
inequitable policing systems).
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Correspondingly, immigration law scholars are also quite aware of
the binary problem.22 Indeed, scholars have suggested that, in constructing
an immigration pathway, we should avoid an all-or-nothing response. 23 In
an era in which congressional reforms have stalled, scholars have suggested
overcoming the binary conundrum by unbundling the benefits of the
desirable end from endpoints that differ from citizenship or full permanent
residence.24 Policy institutes across the political spectrum have echoed the
practical importance of incremental and earned approaches to pathways
involving legalization. 5

22. See, e.g., Villazor, supra note 12 (labeling such a binary "woefully incomplete");
Angelica Chdzaro, Beyond Respectability: New Principlesfor Immigration Reform, 52
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 356 (2015) (critiquing comprehensive immigration reform as a mere
"across the line" measurement that threatens to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, harm
reduction); Hiroshi Motomura, Who Belongs?: Immigration Outside the Law and the Idea of
Americans in Waiting, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 359, 374 (2012) (using the notion of
immigration as contract to more properly characterize undocumented immigrants working
without legal authorization as immigrants in waiting); Nancy Morawetz, The Invisible
Border: Restrictions on Short-Term Travel by Noncitizens, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 201, 221
(2007) (warning that focusing solely on a more robust right to reside in the United States
undervalues noncitizens' interests in unimpeded international travel).
23. See, e.g., Jeremy L. Neufeld, Democrats Need to Abandon Their All-Or-Nothing
Approach to Immigration Reform, ROLL CALL (Oct. 22, 2021), https://www.rollcall.com/
2021/10/22/democrats-need-to-abandon-their-all-or-nothing-approach-to-immigration-refor
m/ [https://perma.cc/32YC-6EML].
24. See, e.g., Villazor, supra note 12, at 1722-24 (noting that United States nationals
of certain United States territories enjoy some, but not all, of the bundle of citizenship rights,
and that not all undocumented immigrants want the full bundle of citizenship rights);
Morawetz, supra note 22, at 235-37 (suggesting the meaningful impact of both judicial
interpretation solutions as well as administrative fixes streamlining the process of advance
parole for individuals in the middle of the permanent residence process to allow for
international travel); see also Howard F. Chang, The Economics ofImmigration Reform, 52
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 111, 140 (2018) (observing that comprehensive immigration reform bills
focusing on expanded nonimmigrant visa categories rather than quicker pathways to
permanent residence or citizenship, may effectively respond to political concerns about a
glut of labor supply).
25. Why Don't Immigrants Apply for Citizenship?, supra note 16 (acknowledging
popular sentiment for a "line" for undocumented immigrants for legal status while critically
observing the lack of them for both undocumented and even lawfully present noncitizens
alike);

T.

IMPROVING

ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF
THE

U.S.

&

IMMIGRATION

DONALD KERWIN, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD.,
SYSTEM IN THE FIRST YEAR OF THE BIDEN

ADMINISTRATION 11 (2020), https://cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Improving-theUS-Immigration-SystemProposals_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/BU76-RUDU] (advocating
more specifically for an immediate expansion of individuals eligible for Deferred Action for
Child Arrivals ["DACA"] relief, in addition to advancement of parole and parole-in-place
privileges for DACA recipients, while also expressing support for legislation allowing a
pathway to citizenship); NOWRASTEH & BIER, supra note 4, at 2 (suggesting that a way to
break through comprehensive immigration reform gridlock for undocumented immigrants
might include pathways that contain various timelines only ending in permanent residence
and that bar "chain migration" of immediate family members).
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The building blocks of a working definition regarding what exactly
an immigration pathway is have emerged from this discussion. For many
reasons, that definition is worth constructing. And, as suggested by Part II,
infra, that provides a better set up for appreciating how the lack of
pathways in employment-based immigration contribute to the validity of
this working definition.
B. Towards A Four-Element Working Definition of Immigration
Pathway
1.

Element One: Actions

Actions, the first element in the working definition, refer to those
steps the noncitizen must take to obtain the immigration benefit at the
desirable end of the pathway. This element admittedly builds upon the
popular political notions of meritocracy as applied to immigration
pathways, that individuals on such a pathway will receive the desirable
benefit by earning it. 2 6 Providing work skills that a country needs seems to
justify the "actions" element for any immigration pathway, even if it is
essentially a form of amnesty.2 7 That remains the case, despite other
scholars' rightful critique of the normative consequences of an "earned"
immigration system, especially with regard to its implication that actions
must somehow redeem the past "transgression" of an entry without
inspection, an overstay, or other holding of undocumented status. 2 8 Yet,
many concede this element of meritocracy to be a sine qua non of practical
passage of immigration pathways. 29
A further useful division of the actions element consists of public
actions and private actions. Public actions-those directly supervised by
and accounted for by government actors-that satisfy the actions element in
reform-minded proposals include paying back and prospective taxes,
26. See, e.g., Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization
Act, S.744, 113th Cong. §§ 2301-02 (2013) (proposing a merit-based points system for
permanent residence); Reforming American Immigration for Strong Employment Act,
S.354, 115th Cong. §§ 220(c)-(i) (2017) (proposing a much narrower merit-based points
system centered only around significantly fewer qualifying actions); Dream Act of 2021,
S.264, 117th Cong. § 3(d) (2021) (requiring college enrollment, a high school diploma, or
ongoing secondary education for long-term noncitizen residents of the United States who
entered as children, and hold no status under U.S. immigration law, to seek permanent
residence).
27. Richard Boswell, Crafting an Amnesty with Traditional Tools: Registration and
Cancellation,47 HARV J. ON LEGIS. 175, 176 (2010).
28. See Muneer I. Ahmad, Beyond Earned Citizenship, 258 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
257, 288 (2017) (finding the notion of unlawful entry as transgression troubling given the
"deficit position" from which a noncitizen who is undocumented often starts their
immigration pathway); see also Linda Bosniak, Amnesty in immigration: forgetting,
forgiving,freedom, 16 CRITICAL REV. INT'L. SOC. & POL. PHIL. 344, 346 (2013).
29. See Ahmad, supra note 28, at 302-03.
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refraining from future crime, joining the military, and avoiding other
grounds of inadmissibility and deportability under immigration law. 30
Private actions that satisfy the "actions" element include learning English,
attaining certain levels of education, maintaining moral character, doing
community service, engaging in entrepreneurial activity, and working in
areas of high or essential need. 3 1
2.

Element Two: Time

Time, the second element, addresses the waiting or fast-tracking of
an individual at the undesired end of the pathway to the desired end.
Certainly, the time element has been the subject of a trade-off in
comprehensive immigration reform.3 2 This trade-off proposes that certain
individuals should be allowed pathways to citizenship or permanent
residence, but they should be at the "back of the line"-behind other classes
of noncitizens-and should wait the longest to reach the desirable end. 33 By
contrast, those individuals potentially contributing "more desirable" actions
should wait less time. Accordingly, the first two elements can work in
mutual exclusivity to one another, as they do in many reforms targeting socalled priority or highly-skilled immigrants. Alternatively, a pathway can
bulk up on requirements on both the action and time elements as a
reflection of lower priority, as a need for a more politically viable trade-off,
or as a way to safeguard a higher priority with many moving parts (and that
also could use a more politically viable trade off).
The elemental nature of "time" in a working definition of an
immigration pathway becomes more obvious when one considers the
mishandling of that element in several existing legal immigration pathways.
30. See, e.g., 5 Things to Know About Immigrants in the Military, FWD.US (Jan. 6,
2020), https://www.fwd.us/news/immigrants-in-the-military/ [https://perma.cc/8VCX-VDN
Y]; Miriam Jordan, The Reality Behind Biden's Plan to Legalize 11 Million Immigrants,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/us/biden-undocumentedimmigrants-citizenship.html [https://perma.cc/5UTj-LYQ9].
31. See Dream Act of 2021, S.264, 117th Cong. (2021); Chapter 8 - Educational
Requirements, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/
volume-12-part-d-chapter-8 [https://perma.cc/C5P3-U45X] (last visited Dec. 21, 2021).
32.
LINE:

See, e.g., CLAIRE BERGERON, MIGRATION POL'Y INST., GOING TO THE BACK OF THE
A

PRIMER

ON

LINES,

VISA

CATEGORIES,

AND

WAIT

TIMES

(2013),

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/CIRbrief-BackofLine.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8NMD-6PJW].
33. See, e.g., Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, H.R. 2330, 109th Cong.
§§ 701-02 (2005) (creating a new H-5B nonimmigrant category for undocumented
noncitizens but also preventing them from changing their nonimmigrant or immigrant status
into any other categories or pathways or attaining permanent residence for six years);
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S.1348, 110th Cong. § 625 (2007)
(providing for conditional permanent residence for noncitizen long-term U.S. residents who
entered as children, but requiring six years of such conditional status before permitting a
petition to remove conditions to obtain lawful permanent residence or permitting an
application for naturalization).
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Such mishandling includes lengthy processing delays before the
immigration agencies. 34 It also includes over three decades of congressional
inaction on raising the supply of immigrant visas. 35 This inaction has
produced astronomical backlogs for prospective immigrants worldwide,
especially for immigrants from certain countries.3 6 It is unsurprising that
these failures to equitably handle the time element in existing pathways has
often spurred calls for new, more efficient pathways, some of which would
eliminate backlogs mandated by lack of immigrant visas entirely.3 7
Additionally, aside from the more privileged confines of benefits-based
immigration practice of family-based and employment-based immigration,
the recent lack of formal tracking policies for asylum seekers at the
southern border adds, among other frustrations, time to an already arduous
immigration pathway. 38
34. See Stuart Anderson, USCIS Immigration Delays Grow Longer and Longer,
FORBES (Jan. 21, 2019, 12:12 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2019/01/31
/uscis-immigration-delays-grow-longer-and-longer/?sh=17cdl6212254 [https://perma.cc/LC

34-WARS].
35. The last adjustment to the worldwide limitations on immigrant visas for those
categories of permanent residence subject to numerical limitation was in 1990. Immigration

Act of 1990, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1990). If the worldwide limitation in any family-based or
employment-based category subject to such a limit is reached, any immigrant seeking to
complete the permanent residence process inside or outside the United States must wait until
their priority date-typically the date on which their immigrant visa petition was filed with
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") or when their application for
alien employment certification was filed with the United States Department of Labor for
certain employment-based immigrants-becomes current. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-52 (2021); 8

C.F.R. § 204.5(d) (2017).
36. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT OF IMMIGRANT VISA APPLICANTS IN THE
FAMILY-SPONSORED AND EMPLOYMENT-BASED PREFERENCES REGISTERED AT THE NATIONAL

VISA CENTER AS OF NOVEMBER 1, 2020 (2020), https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/
Statistics/Immigrant-Statistics/WaitingList/WaitingListltem 2020 vF.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FB33-JBRJ] (reporting 3,762,891 applicants for immigrant visas were awaiting available
priority dates that would enable them to complete the permanent residence process, an
increase of 7.7% overall for fiscal year 2019); U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., APPROVED EMPLOYMENT BASED PETITIONS AWAITING VISA
AVAILABILITY
BY
PREFERENCE
CATEGORY
AND
COUNTRY
OF
BIRTH
(2020),

https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/reports/EB11401360_I526_performanc
edata fy2020_Q3_Q4.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PAP-Y3AJ] (reporting 500,268 approved
immigrant visa petitions awaiting an available priority date); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, VISA
BULLETIN (2021), https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletinoctober
2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/TT32-DN57] (reporting six to fourteen years of priority date
backlogs for various categories of family-based immigrants, up to nineteen years for certain
family-based immigrants from countries which utilize more than seven percent of the total
amount of these family-based immigrants visas, and up to eleven years for certain
employment-based immigrants from countries which utilize more than seven percent of the
total amount of these employment-based immigrant visas).

37. See, e.g., U.S. Citizenship Act, H.R. 1177, 117th Cong. § 3402 (2021) (eliminating
numerical limitations for any immigrant whose priority date is more than ten years old).
38. See, e.g., Al Otro Lado v. Mayorkas, No. 17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC, 2021 WL
3931890 at *14 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2021) (noting that government metering policy turning
away immigrants seeking admission at the southern border caused a delay in asylum and
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Furthermore, scholars have recognized the elemental nature of time
in any immigration pathway in various ways. Some have noted that asking
certain noncitizens to wait for advancement along the pathway is logically
and normatively incongruent with the contract-based or affiliation-based
equities they have created in the United States through the value of their
labor, their community, and their family ties. 39 Others have noted that
quicker movement along the immigration pathway could produce positive
effects in integration, loyalty formation, and economic and non-economic
investment. 40
3.

Element Three: Progression

Progression, the third element of the working definition, is the key
distinguisher between a binary immigration system and an immigration
pathway. More narrowly, it is an element that envisions incremental
progress towards the desired end of the pathway, rather than an
instantaneous, one-shot achievement. Indeed, a proposed immigration
pathway to permanent residence or citizenship may fall victim to disfavor
precisely because the lack of incremental progress threatens a narrative of
earned benefits.
Moreover, the immigration system already has at its disposal
systems of nonimmigrant visa status and permanent resident status, each
with more or less desirable benefits that could reward interim progress.41 In
theory, this is exactly what should help reformers overcome the binary
between a noncitizen's undocumented status (or their holding of fragile
protections such as deferred action, parole, or temporary protected status)
and a pathway endpoint of permanent residence or citizenship.
Scholars have likewise laid the foundation for the concept of an
incremental progression toward legal status as an element of the working
definition. They note that a lack of progression in United States
immigration law is generally responsible for the larger share of
undocumented immigrants overall, as well as a notable number of such
individuals compelled to seek "necessity entrepreneurship"-motivated by
survival and lack of alternative choices-outside the bounds of employersupervised work that requires elusive legal immigration status. 4 2 One
refugee application process, resulting in a violation of the requisite inspection and referral
process).
39. Motomura, supranote 22, at 373-77.
40. Cristina Rodriguez, The Citizenship Paradox in a TransnationalAge, 106 MICH.

L. REv. 1111, 1119-20 (2008).
41. See, e.g., Cecilia Danger, The H-2A Non-Immigrant Visa Program: Weakening Its
Provisions Would Be a Step Backwardfor America's Farmworkers, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.

L. REv. 419,420 (2000).
42. Eric Franklin Amarante, Criminalizing Immigrant Entrepreneurs (and Their
Lawyers), 61 B.C. L. REv. 1323, 1344 (2020) (highlighting the phenomenon of the
"necessity entrepreneur" in the undocumented immigrant population resulting from harsh

'
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framework envisions better public pathway progression, noting that both de
minimis punishments and "interim guestworker" status for noncitizens in
proposed legalization pathways could serve that purpose. 43 Likewise,
permanent residence could be the final step in the process for individuals
present in existing temporary guest worker programs. 44
An economic approach suggests that incremental progress points
along a pathway to citizenship may optimize fiscal impact of each
noncitizen in conjunction with sensible restrictions on means-tested
benefits. 45 Another framework would evaluate progression for the sake of
the pathway in a decidedly private and normative way: greater community
integration. 46
4.

Element Four:Protection

Protection, the last element, is perhaps the least obvious of the four
elements of the working definition. Protection goes hand in hand with
progress; it is a set of assurances to the noncitizen of the various benefits
that result from the actions and time put toward the immigration pathway.
The first assurance is that a noncitizen will not unfairly lose their progress
on actions and time already made along the immigration pathway towards
permanent residence or citizenship. The second is that a noncitizen will not
lose other interim immigration benefits of value. The third is that the
noncitizen will not suffer other non-immigration-related harm on the
pathway.
There is both broad conceptual support and specific rights-based
support for this element in immigration law scholarship. 47 For example, a
harm-reduction approach mandates that any immigration pathway avoids
making noncitizens worse off 48 It can also be used to critique the broad
strokes of pathway-based immigration reform.49 Any conventional,
politically-expedient pathway's trade-offs will inevitably worsen protection
and increase harm for those left behind.50 On the other hand, better
pathways might make protection, rather than actions grounded in desert,
more important.5

working conditions and foreclosure of legal immigration
immigration reform).
43. Rodriguez, supra note 40, at 1115, 1127.
44. Id. at 1127.
45. Chang, supra note 24, at 127, 142.
46. Id. at 142-43.
47. Chdzaro, supranote 22, at 362, 387-88.
48. Id. at 388.
49. Id. at 401-03.
50. Id. at 389-97.
51. Id. at 411.

pathways

by restrictive
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In addition, scholars have conceptualized the protection of
important interim immigration benefits along a pathway.52 One such benefit
is the right to travel internationally in the interim, whether as part of the
noncitizen's cyclical, migration-like obligations, or as needed in exigent
circumstances .5 Another important benefit arises from the guarantee of
continuing employment authorization beyond the right to remain legally in
the United States during the progression along the pathway.5 4 This lowers
unemployment, raises wages, opens access to healthcare and, by
extension, protects against over-work and reduces debt obligations to
unpaid bills or mounting household expenses.55 For all immigrants moving
through the pathway, during which administrative agencies must approve
interim benefits such as employment authorization, 56 advance parole,57
classification requests (such as nonimmigrant visa petitions and
applications for extensions of stay), applications for alien employment
certification, and immigrant visa petitions, 58 there is hope for protection
from questionable statutory interpretation,59 inadequate rulemaking,60
arbitrary and capricious agency adjudication, 61 processing delays, 62 and

52. Id. at 413-14.
53. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 222-23.
54. Shoba S. Wadhia, Demystifying Employment Authorization and Prosecutorial
Discretion in Immigration Cases, 6 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 19 (2016).
55. Id. at 19-20 (noting that DACA recipients self-reported economic improvement
resulting from employment authorization granted by the program).
56. Certain classes of immigrants must apply for separate authorization to work

legally in the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (2012).
57. Certain individuals without a valid nonimmigrant or immigrant visa and who wish
to travel internationally during the pendency of certain immigration applications and
petitions must obtain advance parole to return to the United States. Certain individuals who
are applying for permanent residence and who wish to leave the country while that
application is pending must apply for advance parole. Otherwise, the departure constitutes an
abandonment of the permanent residence application. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(4)(ii) (2019).
Upon the approval of whatever status the immigrant was seeking to acquire, advance parole
ends. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e) (2001). See Morawetz, supra note 22, at 214 (explaining that
advance parole is a legal fiction that considers such an immigrant as still seeking admission
to the United States and no longer in whatever previous immigration status the immigrant
was in before departure).
58. Part II, infra, describes in greater detail the basics of the employment-based
immigration system.
59. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 233.
60. See Chris Gafner & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Attracting the Best and the Brightest: A
Critique of the Current U.S. Immigration System, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 183, 204-05
(2010) (drawing a through-line from the lack of agency regulations for the national interest
waiver exception that lets certain immigrants in the employment-based second preference
classification forego a statutorily required test of the labor market to its ineffectiveness and
unpopularity as a measure to attract "deserving" immigrants).
61. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Green Cardsfor ForeignHouse Buyers: A Way to Help
Stabilize Housing Prices, 45 TULSA L. REv. 471, 475 (2010) (observing the restrictive
agency rulings that plagued immigrant investors seeking permanent residence under the U.S.
immigration law's employment-based fifth preference classification).
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unnecessarily onerous procedures.6 3 If recent federal court litigation is to be
believed, these concerns are well-founded. 64
Finally, there is some discussion among scholars about protections
that go beyond aspects of immigration status and employment
authorization. 65 These scholars emphasize the long-overdue need for
workplace protections for noncitizens, which exist regardless of any binary
between undocumented and documented. 66 Others refer to the importance
of workplace mobility during the pendency of the pathway, especially as a
preventative measure against both abusive employers and economic
downturn. 67 Meanwhile, measures protecting access to other public rights,
such as driver's licenses, center harm reduction as a potentially superior
version of the protection element in immigration reform proposals, even as
it would positively affect compliance in an actions-based pathway. 68
II. ENTER THE LESSONS OF PATHWAYS FROM EMPLOYMENT-BASED
IMMIGRATION

The world of employment-based immigration seems, at first, an illfitting lens through which to tackle the dilemma of a pathway to permanent
residence or citizenship. After all, pathway proposals rightfully identify the
hardship of undocumented immigrants as warranting the most important
reform. 69 Employment-based immigrants largely enjoy an existence of legal
immigration status, greater private sector support due to the employerdriven nature of that statutory scheme, and larger amounts of human capital
and economic security due to the requirements of, or preferences for, higher
degrees of education, work experience, or professional distinction. 70

62. See, e.g., id. at 476; Chang, supra note 24, at 125-26; Wadhia, supra note 54, at
25.
63. See Morawetz, supra note 22, at 236.

64. See generally Ahmed v. Holder, 12 F. Supp. 3d 747, 761-62 (E.D. Pa. 2014)
(holding that a six-year delay in adjustment application violated APA); Succar v. Ashcroft,
394 F.3d 8, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that there was no statutory bar to review).
65. See, e.g., ChAzaro, supra note 22, at 414-15.

66. See id. at 368, 384.
67. See Morawetz, supra note 22, at 223, 237.
68. Chdzaro, supra note 22, at 413-14 (identifying driver's license access as an
effective example of a harm reduction measure indicative of more meaningful immigration
reform).
69. See id. at 356.
70. The employment-based first preference immigrant visa category recognizes
individuals of "extraordinary ability," "outstanding professors or researchers," and
"multinational executives or managers." 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1) (1991). The employmentbased second preference immigrant visa category is reserved for individuals with advanced
degrees or exceptional ability. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2). The employment-based third
preference immigrant visa category is largely reserved for individuals with bachelor's
degrees. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3). And the employment-based fifth preference immigrant visa
category is for so-called "employment creation" immigrants who contribute either $800,000
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Yet, in interrogating the notion of an immigration pathway, it is
still worth taking a closer look at the world of employment-based
immigration, a set of nonimmigrant and immigrant visa categories also
wholly lacking in pathways despite benefitting from slightly less polarized
political sentiment. These categories represent a broad array of immigrant
benefits including parole, temporary visas with work authorization and
extension privileges, conditional permanent residence, and lawful
permanent residence.
The literature, at least in legal academia, on employment-based
immigration has been sparse. 7 ' This Article suggests a benefit to breaking
that drought, precisely because the system of employment-based
immigration provides a better statutory and regulatory canvas for creating
an immigration pathway. After all, unlike many proposed immigration
pathways, these offerings in United States immigration law at least purport
to offer many benefits that a mere endpoint of permanent residence cannot.
Ultimately, the working definition of pathway can be used to critique the
specific failures of the United States employment-based immigration
system to create good pathways for entrepreneurs, small business owners,
and investors, and can provide useful insights for subsequent practical
critiques of future immigration pathway proposals.
A. An Overview of the Employment-Based Immigration Process
An immigrant's journey through the
employment-based
immigration statutes and regulations typically starts with admission in a
nonimmigrant, or temporary, visa status.72 Some nonimmigrant visas have
no maximum limit on the amount of overall time an individual can spend in
the status so long as extensions are timely filed, while others have strict
caps on maximum periods of stay. 73
Should the immigrant and their employer both agree to pursue
permanent residence on behalf of the former, they begin the three-step
or $1,050,000, depending on geographic area, to a United States enterprise that creates or
saves the jobs of ten full-time United States workers. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5).
71. This scarcity is in great contrast to the literature generated by policy institutes and
the employment-based immigration practitioner community.
72. The most common such nonimmigrant or "work visa" categories are at 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(15)(B) (business visitors); § 1101(a)(15)(E) (treaty traders and investors); §
1101(a)(15)(H) (temporary employees in a specialty occupation, agricultural workers, and
seasonal workers); § 1101(a)(15)(L) (intracompany transferees from an international
company's overseas operations); § 1101(a)(15)(O) (individuals of extraordinary ability in
arts, athletics, business, or science); and § 1101(a)(15)(P) (artists, athletes, and entertainers).
73. H-1B nonimmigrants (working in specialty occupations that require a bachelor's
degree or their equivalent), subject to exceptions for long-delayed petitions for permanent
residence, cannot spend more than six years in H-1B status in the United States. 8 U.S.C. §
1184(g)(4). For L-1A nonimmigrants (intracompany executives or managers), the limit is
seven years. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(D)(i). For L-1B nonimmigrants (intracompany

specialized knowledge employees), the limit is five years. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(D)(ii).
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process of permanent residence at one of two points. 74 The first step is an
application for a labor certification made to the Department of Labor after
testing the United States labor market to find no qualifying, willing, able,
and available United States workers with the position's minimum
requirements and affirming that the immigrant's permanent employment
will not adversely affect the wages and conditions of United States
workers.75
The second step is an immigrant visa petition filed with the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), requesting formal
classification under one of five employment-based immigration preference
categories. Certain higher-priority or special immigrants are exempt from
the full labor certification requirement. They include: (1) the entire first
preference, consisting of individuals of extraordinary ability, outstanding
professors or researchers, or multinational employees who held executive or
managerial roles abroad and will continue to do so in the United States; 76
(2) certain second preference immigrants, who: (a) are individuals of
exceptional ability, or (b) are members of two critical shortage occupations:
physical therapists and nurses; 77 (3) fourth-preference immigrant religious
workers or special immigrants; 78 and (4) fifth-preference employment
creation investors whose qualifying investment creates or saves ten United
States full-time jobs. 79
After USCIS approves the immigrant visa petition, the third step in
the process requires the individual to "use" the immigrant visa to adjust his
or her existing lawful immigration status to that of a lawful permanent
resident, 80 or to take the approved petition and apply for an immigrant visa
at a United States consulate or embassy abroad that can then be used to
enter the United States in permanent resident status. 8 1 If there is no waiting
74. Employment-Based Immigrant Visas, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE - BUREAU OF
CONSULAR AFF., https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/immigrate/employmentbased-immigrant-visas.html [https://perma.cc/3U9N-4JT6] (last visited Dec. 26, 2021).

75. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i) (2021).
76. These immigrants need not file a labor certification at all, as opposed to third
preference immigrants, who are required to apply for one. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(b)(1)-(3).
Individuals of extraordinary ability do not need a specific job offer from an employer. 8

C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(5) (2021).
77. These immigrants must still file a labor certification application but need not test
the U.S. labor market or attest to the lack of adverse effect on U.S. workers, as the
Department of Labor has predetermined these occupations do not have sufficient qualified,
willing, able, and available U.S. workers and that permanent employment of immigrants in
these positions does not adversely affect U.S. workers' wages and working conditions. 20
C.F.R. § 656.5 (2021). Additionally, if an individual of exceptional ability is performing
work in the national interest, no employer sponsor is needed. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i)

(2021).
78.
79.
80.
81.

8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4).
Id § 1153(b)(5).
Id § 1255.
8 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (2021); 22 C.F.R. § 42.42 (2021); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 9
FOREIGN AFFS. MANUAL § 504.1 [hereinafter 9 Foreign Affs. Manual].
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line due to the numerical or per-country limitations in the immigrant visa
category, the immigrant can proceed to this step immediately (or, if in the
United States, may apply for adjustment of status concurrently). 82 If there is
a waiting line due to a priority date backlog in the category, the immigrant
must wait until the priority date becomes current to undertake this third
step.83
B. Brief Pathway Observations of Employment-Based Immigration to
Annual Renewal Through Congressional Appropriations
Before shifting attention more directly toward pathway discussions,
immigrant entrepreneurs, small business owners, and investors, and
ultimately back to reform-minded immigration proposals, it is worthwhile
to begin by looking at reauthorization provisions for three existing
piecemeal immigration programs that find their way into annual spending
bills immunized from anti-immigration reforms. These programs hint at
pathways for foreign nationals from either a lack of immigration status or a
non-robust status to the more desirable point of permanent residence. 84
These renewals have essentially constituted the entirety of pathwaypromoting, employment-based immigration legislation over the past quarter
century.8 5 These programs-the Conrad 30 Program for J-1 physicians, the
fourth preference immigrant non-minister religious worker program, and
the fifth presence immigrant investor pilot program-earn mixed reviews
when evaluated using the articulated working pathway definition.8 6
The Conrad 30 Program rewards international doctors present in
the United States in J-1 nonimmigrant visa status for performing medical
services in underserved areas in the United States.8 7 Specifically, it creates a
82.

WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46291, THE EMPLOYMENT-BASED

IMMIGRATION BACKLOG (Mar. 26, 2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/
R46291 [https://perma.cc/NL3D-SMEX]; Visa Availability and Priority Dates: Availability
of Immigrant Visas, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/green-card-processes-and-procedures/visa-availability-and-priority-dates [https://perma.

cc/6U6G-WN2F] (last visited Dec. 26, 2021).
83. See 9 Foreign Affs. Manual § 504.1-2(c), supra note 81.
84. Green Card Eligibility Categories: Green Card through Employment, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-eligibilitycategories [https://perma.cc/YS5G-VLEJ] (last visited Dec. 26, 2021).
85. Stuart Anderson, House Bill Keeps Immigration Measures for High-Skilled
Immigrants, FORBES (Nov. 1, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2021/11/
01/house-bill-keeps-immigration-measures-for-high-skilled-immigrants/?sh=6bb352e9168e
[https://perma.cc/U5LS-XLFM].
86. The Conrad 30 Program's authorization expired on December 3, 2021. Extending
Government Funding and Delivering Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 117-43, § 106,
135 Stat. 344 (2021). The non-minister religious worker program expired on September 30,
2021, and the immigrant investor pilot program expired on June 30, 2021. Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021 Division O, Title I, Pub. L. No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182 (2020).
As of the writing of this Article, Congress has not reauthorized the latter two programs.

87. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1184(1) (2021).
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rare bridge between the restrictions of that status, which does not allow
holders to intend to seek permanent residence and requires holders to return
to their previous foreign residence for two years prior to a return to the
United States in any other status permitting immigrant intent,88 and H-1B
nonimmigrant status, which allows for immigrant intent. 89 In exchange for
entering into a bona fide, full-time employment contract to practice
medicine for at least three years at a healthcare facility located in an area
designated by the United States Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) as a Health Professional Shortage Area, Medically Underserved
Area (MUA), or Medically Underserved Population (MUP), or serving
patients who reside in such an area, United States immigration law will
waive the foreign residence requirement, subject to a "no objection"
statement from the home country. 90
This oft-renewed piecemeal program comes close to a true
pathway, but could better reflect the seeming priority such noncitizens
should enjoy in the employment-based immigration ecosystem. By one
turn, it avoids the roadblock of time since the corresponding H-1B petition
that the employing health care facility must file is not subject to the annual
numerical limitation of 65,000 H-1B petitions per year. 91 By another turn,
the lack of supply creates an insurmountable time obstacle, as only thirty
Conrad waivers can be approved per state per year. 92 Assuming the
physician can get around that limit, there is a slight lack of expedited
interim progression per the definition's third element.
Should the noncitizen doctor wish to pursue permanent residence,
they may apply for a national interest waiver exempting them from a labor
market test and conditions attestation if they: (1) have already worked fulltime for five years as a physician in an area or areas designated by the HHS
Secretary as having a shortage of healthcare professionals, or at a health
care facility under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and
a federal agency or a state public health department has previously
determined that the alien physician's work in such an area or at such facility
was in the public interest; and (2) they agree to continue to do so pursuant
to a job offer. 93 Still, this corresponding application for labor certification
and the corresponding immigrant visa petition that the same facility must
file for that noncitizen receives no greater priority than other applications or
petitions filed by other non-medical employers on behalf of other
noncitizens. These doctors do not receive an exemption from the annual

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (2021).
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(16) (2021).
8 U.S.C. § 1182(e).
Id. § 1184(1)(2)(A).
Id. § 1184(1)(1)(B).
Id. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(ii).
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numerical limitations on immigrant visas in the employment-based second
preference category.9 4
As an aside, noncitizen nurses enjoy equal treatment to noncitizen
doctors at the employment-based permanent residence stage, as they are
considered second-preference Schedule A occupations also exempt from
the labor certification process's labor market test and job attestations. 95 That
being said, noncitizen nurses have other pathway problems. In an abject
failure to create progression or protection, Congress failed to renew the HlA and H-1C nonimmigrant visa programs for noncitizen nurses working in
health care shortage areas after 1995 and 2009, respectively. 96
Second, the employment-based fourth ("EB-4") preference
category for immigrant non-minister religious workers allows for: a (1)
noncitizen member of a religious denomination that has a bona fide nonprofit religious organization in the United States, (2) seeking to work fulltime in the United States as a minister, in a religious vocation, or in a
religious capacity, (3) for that bona fide non-profit religious organization or
one affiliated with a United States religious documentation, and (4) after
two or more years of work experience in one of those religious positions
immediately prior to petitioning. 97 It is non-minister positions that have
required reauthorizations for eligibility, while minister positions have
always remained eligible. This program contemplates both noncitizens
directly entering the United States as permanent residents from abroad as
well as those already present, such as in R-1 nonimmigrant status, whose
requirements almost identically mirror that of the EB-4 criteria, save for the
allowance of part-time work. 98 This matching makes it difficult to
categorize this as a pathway because the "actions" element is essentially the
same.

Third, the employment-based fifth preference ("EB-5") pilot
program allows for immigrant investors to contribute funds to a Regional
Center ("RC"), rather than directly to an individual enterprise ("Direct EB5"), which results in the creation or preservation of ten full-time jobs for
United States workers. 99 Similar to the minister/non-minister distinctions in
the EB-4 category, Direct EB-5 investments are permanent and not subject
to annual congressional renewal; only RC ones are. The Regional Center
Program, albeit not immune from detractors 0 0 and controversy, 0 1 suggests

94. Id
95. 20 C.F.R. § 656.5(a)(2) (2021).
96. Immigration Nursing Relief Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-238, 103 Stat. 2099
(1989); Nursing Relief for Disadvantaged Areas Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-95, 113 Stat.

1312 (1999).
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C)(ii)(II)-(III) (2021).
98. Id § 1101(a)(15)(R); 8 C.F.R. § 214(r) (2021).
99. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(m).
100. Steven Malanga, Passportto Fraud, CITY J., https://www.city-joumal.org/federalvisa-program-plagued-by-fraud [https://perma.cc/JFL5-CHPW] (last visited Dec. 22. 2021).
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progression and protection. Under this program, an immigrant entrepreneur
or investor can obtain the stable immigration status position of conditional
permanent residence, skipping over a nonimmigrant visa altogether, even
before the enterprise develops individual initiatives or the foreign national
arrives in the United States. However, it is the Regional Center Program
whose annual authorization was allowed to lapse on June 30, 2021, in the
absence of congressional action. 0 2 Fortuitously, Congress reauthorized the
Regional Center Program as part of appropriations legislation for fiscal year
2022.103 This reauthorization is valid for five years, running through
September 30, 2027, and provides retroactive protection for those pending
EB-5 cases stalled by the gap in the Program's validity. 0 4 Yet the lack of
congressional willingness to make the Regional Center Program permanent
is the ultimate lack of protection or progression for a program which, if not
reauthorized, could jeopardize over 32,000 principal immigrant investors
and their dependents, as well as over 486,000 United States jobs. 0 5 A larger
discussion of the EB-5 pathway failures is explored in Part II(B), supra.
C. Pathway Failures for Immigrant Entrepreneurs, Small Business
Owners, and Investors
The pathway problem becomes even more salient when attention is
directed towards United States immigration options for immigrant
entrepreneurs, small business owners, and investors. One would think the
pathway problems should be minimal to non-existent given the great degree
of fanfare and zeal in many circles about specifically encouraging such
highly skilled immigrants. However, an application of the working
definition clearly proves that the reality is far from that.
1. Pathway Failuresfor NonimmigrantStudent Visa Holders andH-1B
Nonimmigrant Workers

Immigrants may attend a United States institution of higher
education as a student or exchange visitor in the F-1, J-1, or M-1

101. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-696, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS, IMMIGRANT INVESTOR PROGRAM: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO BETTER
ASSESS FRAUD RISKS AND REPORT ECONOMIC BENEFITS (2015).

102. Extending Government Funding and Delivering Emergency Assistance Act, Pub.

L. No. 117-43, § 106, 135 Stat. 344 (2021); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 Division
O, Title I, Pub. L. No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182 (2020).
103. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 202 Division BB, Pub. L. No. 117-103,

__

Stat.

(2022).
104. Id. at §§ 103(b)(1), 105.
105. LEE Y. LI, IMPACT OF THE LAPSE OF THE EB-5 REGIONAL CENTER PROGRAM ON
INVESTORS, INVESTMENTS, AND JOB CREATION 1 (2021), https://iiusa.org/wp-content/

uploads/2021/08/IIUSA-Analysis-Impact-of-the-Lapse-on-Investors-Inestment-and-Jobs-8.2
7.pdf [https://perma.cc/38KV-RLFS].

2022]

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR MODELS

555

nonimmigrant visa categories.1 06 Indeed, policy reports identify these
students as an important source of future economic growth and a breeding
ground for entrepreneurs and small business owners.0 7
Still, there is no set of actions that a student, who is a potential
entrepreneur or investor, may take to automatically progress along an
immigration pathway.1 08 Granted, there is a limited fourteen-month window
for post-degree optional practical training with an employer in a field
related to the degree.1 09 This grant is longer (up to twenty-nine months) if
the individual is working in a science, technology, engineering, or math
("STEM") field." 0 This latter grant option would qualify both as a private
action, finding an employer willing to oversee the training, and as a
progression from a nonimmigrant status that largely forbids employment to
a condition in which one can apply for employment authorization.
However, the H-1B visa remains the most common work visa for
which nonimmigrant students aim. The H-1B visa is available to those
seeking work from employers in positions that require a bachelor's degree
or the equivalent."' The private action required of the nonimmigrant is to
find an employer willing to hire them." 2 That is no small feat given the
prohibitive government filing fees," 3 inter-agency jurisdiction over the H1B petition approval and visa issuance process," 4 and, as discussed in the
next paragraph, the low chance of H-1B petition selection for processing in
the first place." 5
Indeed, a potential progression from student to H-1B nonimmigrant
is anything but assured for two reasons. First, only 65,000 new H-1B visa
petitions may be approved every year, with an additional 20,000 reserved
for nonimmigrants holding an advanced degree from a United States
institution."1 6 This creates an onerous time burden, since nonimmigrants
whose H-1B petitions are not selected for processing must wait until the

106. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(F), (J), (M) (2021).
107. ANTHONY LUPPINO, JOHN NORTON & MALIKA

SIMMONS, KAUFFMAN FOUND.,
REFORMING IMMIGRATION LAW TO ALLOW MORE FOREIGN STUDENT ENTREPRENEURS TO
LAUNCH JOB-CREATING VENTURES IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2012), https://www.immigration

research.org/system/files/kauffmanimmigrationreform.pdf [https://perma.cc/LE3Q-R5JZ].

108. Id at 2-3.
109. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(10)(ii)(A)(3) (2021).
110. Id § 214.2(f)(10)(ii)(C).
111. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE H-1B VISA

PROGRAM: A PRIMER ON THE PROGRAM
AND ITS IMPACT ON JOBS, WAGES, AND THE ECONOMY 1-2 (2021), https://www.american

immigrationcouncil.org/research/hlb-visa-program-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/3S6X-3S77].

112. Id
113. 8 C.F.R. §§ 106.2(a)(3)(i), (c)(4), (c)(5)(i), (c)(7) (2021) (totaling from $555 to
$4,000, depending on the employer).

114. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n) (2021) (requiring a certified labor condition application from
the Department of Labor); 22 C.F.R. § 41.12 (2021) (detailing nonimmigrant visa stamps the
Department of State issues to enable lawful entry into the United States).

115. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1184(g)(1)(A), (g)(5)(C) (2021).
116. Id
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next fiscal year to try again.1 7 This also means that some must leave the
country, an important loss of the protection of the right to remain lawfully
in the United States. Second, and most troublingly, is the effect that an
agency interpretation of who qualifies as entrepreneurs, small business
owners, and investors has on progression: H-1Bs are not available for those
who are self-employed." USCIS has taken a strict interpretation of the
regulatory requirement that an employer must petition for the employee,
and that there must be an employer-employee relationship.11 9 That means
that the employer must be a separate entity with the ability to control,
supervise, hire, and fire the employee. 20 How, then, are such immigrants to
be encouraged to pursue independent endeavors when the next progression
point post-education is antithetical to the entrepreneurial spirit?
2.

Pathway Failuresfor E-2 Treaty Investor Nonimmigrants

This section explores the employment-based immigration field
more directly aimed at immigrant entrepreneurs, small business owners,
and investors. As a general matter, these nonimmigrant and immigrant visa
options fit the first working definitional element, requiring a combination of
public actions, such as incorporation and registration of the business entity,
and private ones, such as possessing or raising funding, hiring others,
acquiring property, and hitting certain financial thresholds.
At first glance, the E-2 nonimmigrant visa category appears to be
an excellent model pathway candidate for immigrant entrepreneurs, small
business owners, and investors. It provides nonimmigrant status for
individuals who will develop, direct, or invest in a United States investment
enterprise.' 2' The private action requested can also be self-initiated, as the
nonimmigrant can build their own business plan and start their own
enterprise as well as join an existing one.' 2 2 The United States immigration
law extends flexibility to the nature of this private action. It requires only
that the investment made by the nonimmigrant or the enterprise (if separate
from the nonimmigrant) be substantial and non-marginal, as considered
based on the nature of the business.1 23
For individuals outside the United States, the time and progression
elements of the pathway are greatly reduced because an initial

117. Id
118. Id § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).
119. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (2021).

120. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERvS., AD 10-24, MEMORANDUM: DETERMINING
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP FOR ADJUDICATION OF H-lB PETITIONS, INCLUDING
THIRD-PARTY SITE PLACEMENTS (2010) (illustrating that a self-employment scenario would
not constitute a required employer-employee relationship).

121. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E)(ii) (2021).
122. Id
123. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(e)(2)(i) (2021).
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nonimmigrant visa petition filing with USCIS is not required. 24 That is, a
United States consulate or embassy can unilaterally decide E-2 status
eligibility. 2 5 Applicants for E-2 status typically must register their E-2
company with the consulate or embassy, which saves time for subsequent
E-2 visa applications and provides a potential protection against the
duplicative efforts of resubmitting unchanged information about the
enterprise.126
Many high-volume E-2 consulates have their own dedicated E visa
units and procedures, helping to manage client expectations. 27 From both a
progression and protection end, after a usual one-year E nonimmigrant visa
stamp issuance, subsequent E nonimmigrant visa stamps can be issued for
up to five-year increments with no maximum time limit.1 28 Entries on a

valid E visa are generally granted for two years at a time, and the
nonimmigrant has the option to extend a period of authorized stay via a
USCIS application, or to re-enter the United States anew on a still-valid E
stamp and receive a fresh two-year stay. 129
Yet a pathway that begins with E-2 status may not even start for

many nonimmigrants. A core threshold eligibility requirement for E-2
status is that the nonimmigrant is a citizen of a country that has a qualifying
treaty of commerce and navigation with the United States, and that a
majority of the United States enterprise is owned by persons or entities that
are citizens of that same country. 30 Only eighty countries have such
treaties.131 Most tellingly, citizens of countries with high amounts of wouldbe immigrant entrepreneurs, small business owners, and investors like
China, India, and Vietnam, lack eligibility.1 32 In Part III, infra, this Article
will address a private action that such citizens have begun to circumvent
this lack of progression.
A further progression deficit of the E-2 visa is that it does not
logically flow into a corresponding immigrant visa category for permanent

124. 22 C.F.R. § 41.51 (2021).
125. Id. §§ 41.51(a)(12), (b)(13).
126. See, e.g., How to Apply, U.S.

EMBASSY

& CONSULATES

embassy.gov/visas/treaty-trader-or-treaty-investor/how-to-apply/

IN THE U.K., https://uk.us
[https://perma.cc/7BMB-K

2X4] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021).
127. Id.
128. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(e)(20) (2021).
129. The Department of State's Visa Reciprocity Table determines the length of time
for which the E nonimmigrant visa stamp is valid. U.S. Visa: Reciprocity and Civil
Documents by Country, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/usvisas/Visa-Reciprocity-and-Civil-Documents-by-Country.html
[https://perma.cc/B675-EB6

L] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(e)(19)-(20) (2021) (governing
extensions of E nonimmigrant status for individuals already in the United States).

130. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E)(ii) (2021).
131. See Treaty Countries, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travet/
en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/fees/treaty.html [https://perma.cc/3CRV-F7FT] (last

visited Dec. 23, 2021).
132. Id.
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residence. In the same way that ownership of an enterprise is fatal to H-1B
status, ownership is fatal to employer sponsorship in employment-based
second and third preference immigration.1 33 Specifically, the required test
of the labor market prior to the application for labor certification
necessitates separation from the employer and the employee.1 34 Put simply,
an employee-owner cannot be trusted to declare the lack of qualifying
willing, able, and available United States workers at the expense of their
own progression along the permanent residence pathway. This makes these
immigrant visa categories largely non-starters for entrepreneurs and, in
particular, small business owners.
Moreover, even pathways in the first three employment-based
preference categories that do not require a test of the labor market lack
progression. Sustained national or international acclaim or recognition of
outstanding accomplishment are required of first preference classification
as an individual of extraordinary ability or an outstanding researcher,
respectively. 13 A demonstration that the work is in the national interest is
required of second preference classification under the national interest
waiver exception.1 36 These are difficult criteria towards which to progress
for an early-stage entrepreneurial business. They are likewise ill-fitting for
small business owners seeking stable returns in predictable industries and
locations.
Finally, a passive immigrant investor-one who does not envision
an active role in the daily management of the enterprise-does not fare well
in the first, second, and third preference categories. With few exceptions,
they require a job offer from an employer,1 37 in addition to education and
experience. "'
It is possible that the E-2 nonimmigrants could develop their
enterprise into one that creates or saves the required ten full-time jobs for
employment-based fifth preference classification as an employment creator.
However, the progression is all but elusive given that job creation is not the
only requirement for that classification, and that the immigrant must
personally invest either $800,000 or $1,050,000 in the enterprise.139
Admittedly, that is less of a problem for a passive immigrant investor. But
not so for an entrepreneur or a small business owner whose stake in the
business may largely consist of sweat equity, or if the goal of the immigrant
is acquisition of the enterprise.

8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(b)(2)-(3) (2021).
20 C.F.R. § 656.17(1) (2021).
8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2021).
Id. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i).
Id. §§ 1153(b)(1)-(3).
Id.
139. Id. § 1153(b)(5)(C), as amended by Consolidated Appropriations Act, 202
Division BB, § 102(a)(3), Pub. L. No. 117-103, __ Stat. __ (2022).
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
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3. Pathway Failuresfor L-JA Nonimmigrantsand FirstPreference
MultinationalManagers or Executives

Another category of visa, the L-lA nonimmigrant visa, is available
to individuals who have worked for a multinational entity during one of the
past three years, and who wish to work for a United States owner,
subsidiary, branch, or joint venture of that entity in an executive or
managerial capacity. 40 The L-1A visa program is largely responsive to the
needs of large, multinational conglomerates. However, an immigrant
entrepreneur, small business owner, or active investor can take the private
action of establishing an international entity and working for it for a year.
Moreover, the L-lA provisions allow for a grant of one year of L-lA status
for individuals coming to open a new United States office of the
multinational entity.' 4' That appears to be an excellent progression point for
an early-stage entrepreneur. USCIS can grant multi-year extensions of LlA status, with a maximum total stay of seven years, as stated earlier.1 42
Yet agency regulations and adjudication trends provide a thorny
minefield for progression. For the new office entrepreneur, agency
guidance anticipates a reduction in the amount of day-to-day employment
by the end of the one year.1 43 That is certainly in opposition to the hands-on
approach most entrepreneurs must take, especially in the early stages of
their enterprises.
Second, while the L-1A standards contemplate that a nonimmigrant
may qualify for L-1A classification by managing important company
functions, agency adjudication trends clearly show a preference for
personnel management and a demonstration of an organizational chartfriendly hierarchy. 144 Those progression expectations are quite unrealistic
for early-stage enterprises that lack the financial resources for additional
personnel. Moreover, the regulations require that most of the
nonimmigrant's direct reports must be professionals. 145 This requirement
forecloses progression of entire entrepreneurial and small business ventures
where employees perform functions that do not require post-secondary
education.
Third, a slight progression problem also occurs if an L-1A
nonimmigrant seeks employment-based first preference classification as a
multinational executive or manager. While the L-lA criteria and the

140. Id § 1101(a)(15)(L).
141. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(7)(i)(A)(3) (2021).
142. Id § 214.2(1)(12)(i).
143. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., ADJUDICATOR'S FIELD MANUAL (Chapter

32.6(d)) (2021).
144. See Jacob T. Muklewicz, Recent trends involving the L-I visa categoryfor intracompany transferees, KIRTON MCCONKIE (July 17, 2015) https://www.kmclaw.com/
publication-Intracompany-transferees-L1-Visa [https://perma.cc/2DVL-ASCW].

145. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(B)(4) (2021).
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multinational executive and manager criteria are largely identical, the latter
requires that the immigrant's initial experience abroad have been
managerial or executive in nature, while the former does not.1 46 As such,
this pathway can punish the immigrant for an action not taken in the early
stages of the enterprise: to be an active manager or executive in their
entrepreneurial or ownership capacity. Similar to the employment-based
fourth preference category for religious workers, the multinational
executive/manager category has significant overlap with its nonimmigrant
visa counterpart but does not embody gradual progression. Rather, it is a
quick, priority date-backlog skipping pathway for immigrants who are
fortunate enough to be able to create, and to sustain, a multinational
endeavor.
4. Pathway Failuresfor Fifth PreferenceEmployment Creation
Immigrants

As mentioned earlier, the employment-based fifth preference
immigration category is reserved for job-creating immigrants who intend to
invest a certain sum of money into a United States enterprise that creates or
saves ten full-time jobs.1 47 If the immigrant invests into a targeted
employment area-one designed by a state as particularly needing job
growth-the investment requirement drops to $800,000.148 Also, as
referenced in Part II(B), supra, if the immigrant invests in a Regional
Center, the burden of choosing a single line of business is relieved, as
Regional Centers can represent any economic unit involved with the
promotion of economic growth.1 49 In addition, Regional Center-based
immigrant visa petitions can show indirect creation of ten full-time jobs,
whereas a traditional direct investment under this category requires direct
creation of ten full-time jobs. 5 0
The permanent residence granted via the fifth-preference
immigration classification is conditional in nature.' 5 ' An immigrant may
petition to remove the conditions two years after initial classification and
will receive full lawful permanent residence if they can show that they have
invested, or are actively in the process of investing, the required capital and
have sustained the investment throughout the period of their residence in
the United States. 5 2 Additionally, the immigrant must show that the new
commercial enterprise either: (1) created, or can be expected to create,
within a reasonable time, at least ten full-time positions for qualifying
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(C) (2021); id. § 1101(a)(15)(L).
Id. § 1153(b)(5)(A)(ii).
Id. § 1153(b)(5)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(f)(2) (2021).
8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e).
Id. §§ 204.6(e), (j)(4)(iii).
Id. § 216.6.
Id.

2022 ]

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR MODELS

561

United States employees; or (2) maintained an existing United States
employee headcount during the two-year conditional period, if the
investment was in a troubled business to save ten qualifying full-time

positions. 153
Entry from nonimmigrant visa status to fifth preference immigrant
classification is, as noted in the earlier E-2 discussion, nonexistent. 154 This
raises immediate progression concerns since, absent the unrelated
accumulation of the necessary investment funds, there is no way for a
nonimmigrant already present in the United States to work up to fifth
preference classification. 5 5 It is an ill-suited progression pathway for an
early-stage entrepreneur.
Admittedly, that does not appear to be the pathway envisioned by
most immigrant investors seeking permanent residence in this fashion.
Rather, they see this route as a progression to citizenship, for which they
can apply after five years of permanent residence in the United States
(which can include the two years of conditional permanent residence).1 56
These investors have three important protection-directed interests in
pursuing this pathway. The first is the attainment of a widely accepted
passport for international travel. 5 7 The second is the ability to invest in a
stable enterprise that will be able to successfully create jobs, promote
economic growth, and ultimately repay their EB-5 capital investment.1 58
The third is the ability to relocate their families and, particularly, their
children to the United States, providing them with greater access to
education. 159
Yet, the immigrant investor pathway still falls short of the working
definition in several respects. A grand total of 10,000 immigrant visas may
be allocated each year to this category.1 60 This causes time-based deficits
for countries with high usage of the program.161 That the single biggest
country for fifth preference permanent residence is China certainly cuts
153. Id. §§ 216.6(a)(4)(ii)-(iv).
154. Id. § 204.6.
155. See id.

156. Id. § 316.2(a)(3).
157. Matthew Galati, STEP 9: Naturalization: The US. Passport at the End of the
Road, EB5 INVS., https://www.eb5investors.com/eb5-guide/eb-5-us-passport [https://perma.
cc/F7M6-9XA2] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021).
158. Kriston Capps, Another Reason to Hate Hudson Yards, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/opinion/hudson-yards.html [https://perma.cc/

A5X6-EB4W].
159. Javier C. Hernindez, Wealthy Chinese Scramble for Imperiled Commodity: U.S.
'Golden Visa', N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/
world/asia/china-eb-5-golden-visa.html [https://perma.cc/N3HC-USS6].

160. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5) (2021).
161. Andy J. Semotiuk, U.S. EB-5 InvestorImmigration Needs Renewal and Overhaul,
FORBES, (Feb. 28, 2021, 8:04 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andyjsemotiuk/2021/02/28
/us-eb-5-investor-immigration--needs-renewal-and--overhaul/?sh=5928878flc4b [https://per
ma.cc/6TW5-8SWB].
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against what should be a desire to encourage an outflow of financial and
human capital from that country, as opposed to an outsourcing of the same
from the United States.
Likewise, the protection element of the immigrant investor pathway
is weak. Unforgiving agency practices scrutinize the source of funding,
disproportionately impacting immigrants without easy access to Westernstyle records of their accumulated capital. 6 2 The agency has long been
skeptical of so-called "material changes" to the nature of investment, even
as such modifications may be financially necessary to protect the viability
of the investment.1 63 Processing time for fifth preference immigrant visa
petitions is infamously long.1 64 As noted in Part II(A), the tenuous year-toyear reauthorization limbo for Regional Center-based petitions causes
unwelcome uncertainty for investors. As critics are quick to point out, there
is always the risk that a Regional Center in which they have little personal
involvement fails, or worse, has been defrauding investors the entire

time. 165
In addition, the targeted employment area-an important
alternative progression route that is likewise intended to optimize job
creation-suffers from its own elemental critiques. Previously a creature of
state designation, it is now decided by the federal government based on
evidence the immigrant provides.1 66 From an equity perspective, it is not as
granular as it should be. Rather, determinations are not made at the local, or
neighborhood level, preventing promotion of the kinds of private actions
that matter to these immigrants (such as schooling and enclave support) and
the kind of protections that matter to advocates (such as community
integration).1 67 Throughout the majority of its history, the EB-5 program
did not borrow industry-targeting components from other immigration
programs like the previously discussed labor-certification exempt second

162. Dillon Colucci & Matthew Galati, Kate's Corner: Recent Developments in
Chinese Source of Funds RFEs (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.eb5investors.com/magazine/
article/chinese-source-of-funds-rfe [https://perma.cc/T6PM-T9NZ] (last visited Feb. 6,

2022).

163. H. Ronald Klasko, What You May Have Missed in the New EB-5 Regulation,
KLASKO IMMIGR.L. PARTNERS, LLP, (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.klaskolaw.com/hotquestions/eb-5-regulation-what-you-may-have-missed [https://perma.cc/X7QA-GVWA].
164. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., NUMBER OF SERVICEWIDE FORMS BY
QUARTER, FORM STATUS, AND PROCESSING TIME, FISCAL YEAR 2021, QUARTER 3 (2021),

https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/data/QuarterlyAllFormsFY2021Q3.p
df [https://perma.cc/6JA3-KYXH] (reporting a thirty-two-month processing time for EB-5
petitions and a thirty-six-month processing time for petitions to remove conditional EB-5
permanent residence).
165. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Fraud Charges Mar a Plan to Aid a Struggling
Vermont Region, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/us/
fraud-charges-mar-a-plan-to-aid-a-struggling-vermont-region.html [https://perma.cc/2KVM-

3XP8].
166. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(6) (2021).
167. See id
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preference occupations (physical therapists and nurses) and Conrad 30
program for certain immigrant doctors.1 68
Still, the recently enacted EB-5 Regional Center reauthorization
purports to incorporate industry targeting in two ways. First, it reserves
twenty percent of the annual 10,000 EB-5 visas for investments in rural
areas; ten percent for investment in high unemployment areas; and two
percent for qualifying infrastructure projects that are administered by a
federal, state or local government entity.169 The new infrastructure
investment category does alleviate some concern raised by federal-only
determination of targeted unemployment areas and does allow for a broader
range of public actions that likewise promote an immigrant investor interest
in community impact. Second, it directs USCIS to prioritize the processing
of petitions for investment in rural areas, an admirable perk of the
alternative progression route that targeted investment provides. 7 0
Moreover, the reauthorization includes a few important safeguards
emblematic of pathway protection. First, it allows for concurrent filing of
the 1-526 petition and the final 1-485 adjustment of status application for
individuals for whom there is not a priority date backlog.' 7' This addition
yields time savings in movement towards conditional performance
residence and the important interim protective benefits of work
authorization (to ensure regular income) and advance parole (to facilitate
international travel). Second, it allows for good-faith investors to maintain
their eligibility for permanent residence if USCIS terminates or debars the
Regional Center in which they invested, or if USCIS decides to let the
Regional Center program expire.12 Yet the increase of the qualifying
investment in a targeted unemployment area or infrastructure project to
$800,000-albeit with further corrections to this amount (and the
$1,050,000 conventional investment figure) every five years based on the
unadjusted consumer price index-does cut against these progressions.
5.

Pathway Failuresof the Recently Revised EntrepreneurParoleRule

An initial regulation under President Obama's administration, in a
maneuver clearly intended to circumvent congressional gridlock on
immigration reform, used the executive branch's power of parole to create
an entrepreneur parole category.1 73 This use greatly differs from other uses
168. See id.
169. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(B), as modified by Consolidated Appropriations Act, 202
Division BB, § 102(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 117-103, _ Stat. _ (2022).
170. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(E)(ii)(I), as added by Consolidated Appropriations Act, 202
Division BB, § 103(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 117-103, _ Stat. _ (2022).
171. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(n), as added by Consolidated Appropriations Act, 202 Division
BB,

§

102(d), Pub. L. No. 117-103,

172.

8 U.S.C.

_

Stat.

§§ 1153(b)(5)(M);

_

(2022).

1153(b)(5)(S),

as added by Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 202 Division BB, § 102(d), Pub. L. No. 117-103, _ Stat.
173. International Entrepreneur Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 5238 (Jan. 17, 2017).

_
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of parole, often reserved outright for general humanitarian reasons or
directly targeted towards immigrant populations with compelling public
interests. 7 4 President Trump's administration initially tried to delay the
rule's effective date, 7 5 but federal litigation overturned the delay for failing
to follow notice-and-comment procedures.1 76 The Trump administration
issued a new notice of proposed rulemaking that would have eliminated the
international entrepreneur parole rule but never finalized it.1 77 As such, the
rule has gone into effect, with a further revision to adjust the required
investment and revenue amounts according to the Consumer Price Index.' 78
The entrepreneur parole rule requires the immigrant to possess a
substantial ownership interest in a start-up entity created within the past
five years in the United States that has substantial potential for rapid growth
and job creation.1 79 The immigrant must have a central and active role in the
start-up entity such that they is well-positioned to substantially assist with
the growth and success of the business. Furthermore, the immigrant must
prove that they will provide a significant public benefit to the United States
based on their entrepreneurial role in the start-up entity by showing that: (1)
the start-up entity has received a significant investment of capital from
certain qualified United States investors with established records of
successful investments; (2) the start-up entity has received significant
awards or grants for economic development, research and development, job
creation, or other types of grants or awards typically given to start-up
entities from federal, state, or local government entities that regularly
provide such awards or grants to start-up entities; or (3) the immigrant
partially meets either or both of the previous two requirements and provides
additional reliable and compelling evidence of the start-up entity's
substantial potential for rapid growth and job creation. 8 0
At first glance, the rule seems to solve some of the working
definition's critiques of the other pathways. Specifically, it seems to be a
better starting point immediately after the non-desirable end of the binary. It
is available both to individuals currently in the United States, as well as to
those outside of it.181 It does not contain a cap on admissions or degree
requirements. Its initial grant is valid for thirty months. 8 2 It permits
174. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5(b) (humanitarian parole generally), 212.5(h) (Cuban
and Haitian nationals), 212.12 (Mariel Cubans), 212.14 (immigrant witnesses and
informants).
175. International Entrepreneur Rule: Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 31,887

(July 11, 2017).
176. Nat'l Venture Cap. Assoc. v. Duke, 291 F. Supp. 3d 5, 20-21 (D.D.C. 2017).
177. Removal of International Entrepreneur Parole Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 24,415

(May 29, 2018).
178. International Entrepreneur Program: Automatic Increase of Investment and
Revenue Amount Requirements, 86 Fed. Reg. 50,839 (Sep. 13, 2021).

179.
180.
181.
182.

8 C.F.R. § 212.19 (2021).
Id.
Id. §§ 212.19(a)(5), (b)(1).
Id. § 212.19(d)(2).
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minimal individual ownership common to startups, just ten percent at the
initial parole stage and just five percent at the reauthorization of the parole
stage.1 83 It has lower fixed and target funding thresholds-$105,659 from
government awards or grants, or $264,147 for more qualified investors. 184
These thresholds jump to an aggregate requirement of $528,293 in funding
from both of these categories for reauthorization, although creation of five
jobs, $500,000 in annual revenue, or average annual growth of 20%
throughout the initial parole grant can substitute for eligibility.1 85 These
outside funding criteria are more permissive of outside investment in a way
that the E-2 visa, which requires majority ownership from citizens of the
same country, and the fifth-preference immigrant visa, which requires the
individual to put their own funds at risk, are not.
Yet the working definition reveals the entrepreneur parole
pathway's deficits. From a protection perspective, parole is a fragile status.
As described earlier, it is permission to be in the United States without
being considered admitted. 8 6 As such, a nonimmigrant physically present
in the United States on parole cannot change status to another immigration
status or, absent an exception, adjust status to permanent residence.1 87 The
nonimmigrant parolee only gets one additional reauthorization for parole
beyond the initial grant.' 88 A recipient of entrepreneur parole must maintain
a household income that is greater than 400% of the federal poverty line for
his or her household size.1 89 That may not be the business reality of a
startup only funded at the six-figure level, or who may forgo compensation
until acquisition and to ensure appropriate compensation of initial
employees
and independent
contractors.
Unsurprisingly,
expert
practitioners in the immigrant entrepreneur, small business owner, and
investor space have their doubts about recommending the current
entrepreneur parole route as an entry point onto a pathway to permanent
residence and citizenship.1 90 The great degree of economic privilege that
these noncitizens carry would understandably make them more risk-averse
to holding a tenuous status in United States immigration law.
On the progression element, there is also no natural pathway to fifth
preference immigrant visa classification. Personal at-risk investment of that
degree is at cross purposes to an entrepreneur or small business owner's
183. Id § 212.19(a)(1).
184. Id § 212.19(b)(2)(ii)(B).
185. Id § 212.19(c)(2)(ii)(B).
186. See supra note 72 and accompanying text; International Entrepreneur Rule, 82

Fed. Reg. 5238, 5243 (Jan. 17, 2017).
187. International Entrepreneur Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 5238, 5240 (Jan. 17, 2017).

188. 8 C.F.R. § 212.19(d)(3) (2021).
189. Id. § 212.19(1)
190. Joseph Barnett, Top Five Changes Needed to the International Entrepreneur
Parole Rule, WR IMMIGR. (July 21, 2021), https://wolfsdorf.com/top-five-changes-neededto-the-international-entrepreneur-parole-rule/ [https://perma.cc/4JMM-C6G7] (last visited
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frequent normative aspiration to be acquired. That means a potential loss of
protected immigrant benefits even as they may be gained economically. For
entrepreneurs or small business investors on the other side of that normative
spectrum, the desire to retain control is, as noted earlier, subverted by the
requirement of employer independence in the labor certification process.
Indeed, progression to permanent residence appears not to be contemplated
at all by the rule, as the implementing regulations envision the termination
of parole upon complete acquisition of the immigrant's qualifying
ownership interest in the startup. 191
III. A PRIVATE PATHWAY EXAMPLE IN EMPLOYMENT-BASED
IMMIGRATION

This Article previously discussed the notion that in the actions
element of the working definition of pathway, some required actions were
private in nature. Yet, a curious innovation from the employment-based
immigration practitioner bar goes further than a mere private action: it
provides a "private" pathway that subverts a wholly "public" pathway
under United States immigration law. This is the so-called citizenship-byinvestment or "CBI bridge," allowing an immigrant entrepreneur, small
business owner, or investor to progress towards E-2 nonimmigrant status
and then achieve fifth preference-based permanent residence. Accordingly,
its features warrant closer study and its characterization as a "private"
pathway may be quite apt.
A. The Mechanics of the CBI-E-2-Immigrant Investor Bridge
As noted earlier, if a potential immigrant entrepreneur, small
business owner, or investor is not of the nationality of a country with a
qualifying treaty of commerce and navigation with the United States, they
are not eligible for E-2 status.1 92 To remedy this lack of qualifying
citizenship, an employment-based immigration practitioner specializing in
investor immigration may work with the immigrant to acquire a citizenship
that does.1 93 This is done in a country that allows for expedited citizenship,
as opposed to permanent residence, predicated on a certain threshold of
investment. Grenada, for example, is a popular destination, providing

191. 8 C.F.R. § 212.19(k)(2) (2021).
192. See supra Section II.B, Section II.C.2.
193. Phuong Le & Eric Dominguez, The Rise of Citizenship by Investment, E-2, & EB5 Programs as a Hybrid Immigration & Investment Vehicle to the US, INV. IN THE USA
REG'L CTR. Bus. J., Vol. 10, No. 1, 7 (May 2021), https://iiusa.org/wp-content/uploads/
2021/06/RCBJ-Rise-of-CBI-EB5-E2-Hybird-Immigration-Approach.pdf [https://perma.cc/2
QGH-59KX].
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citizenship upon an investment of $150,000 into a National Transformation
Fund project or at least $300,000 into a qualifying purchase of real estate.1 94
Once citizenship is approved, the immigrant can then apply for E-2
visa status, already armed with a more robust enterprise that has established
a business plan, legal and corporate bona fides, and foreign assets.1 95 This
reduces the laundry list of private actions and time that would otherwise be
required to prepare for initial E-2 registration, and E-2 visa issuance then
enables much easier international travel both in service of monitoring the
now multi-locational investment and attending to personal necessity,
important benefits in the protection column.
Next, given that progression towards substantial assets and
investment will have already occurred to a certain degree in the foreign
aspect of the enterprise, the E-2 nonimmigrant will build up investment
funding sufficient to meet the $800,000 or $1,050,000 requirement for fifth
preference immigrant visa status.1 96 Again, the presence of astute
immigration counsel as well as well-chosen ancillary legal, corporate, and
financial partners from the moment of the original CBI initiative will make
this less onerous than finding a direct investment vehicle or shopping for a
regional center-based enterprise not in harmony with the immigrant's
aspirations or tolerance for risk.
The CBI bridge is not without its limitations. It is a strategy for
individuals with the existing financial capital needed for the original
acquisition of citizenship by investment. Three sets of government filing
fees, immigration counsel fees, other legal counsel fees, financial provider
fees, and business creation expert fees can add tens of thousands of dollars
to the cost of this private pathway. 197 It relies on global mobility, failing to
lend both progression and protection to individuals already in the United
States hoping to jump onto a promising entrepreneurial or small business
owner track. The time window for the CBI, E-2, and permanent residence
pathway is potentially five to seven years in length.1 98 Extensive
discussions about the immigrant's long-term goals will test an investor's
resolve to engage in a myriad of private pathway actions, such as expert
194. Grenada Citizenship by Investment Act, 2013 (Act No. 15 § 10/2013); Grenada
Citizenship by Investment (Amendment) Regulations, 2019 (No. 3/2019) (immigrant
investors bringing immediate relatives require additional investment amounts for National
Transformation Fund investments, ranging from $25,000 to $50,000 per additional
dependent); Cost and Fees, GRENADA CITIZENSHIP BY INV., GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA,
https://www.cbi.gov.gd/index.php/routes-to-citizenship/cost-and-fees (last visited Dec. 23,
2021) [https://perma.cc/SU8C-VGJ5].
195. See generally Le & Dominguez, supra note 193.
196. See Li, supranote 105, at 3.
197. 8 C.F.R. § 212.19(b)(1) (2021); International Entrepreneur Parole, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/
international-entrepreneur-parole#:~:text=You%20must%20file%20Form%20I,biometric%2
Oservices%20fee%20is%20%2485 [https://perma.cc/A2D3-FTMC] (last visited Dec. 23,
2021); see also Le & Dominguez, supra note 193, at 8.
198. See Le & Dominguez, supra note 193, at 8.
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business plan construction that meets both immigration agency criteria and
sound business practices to inventory, advisory on deal terms, multilocational management, organization structure development, financing, and
document standardization, among others.1 99
In addition, once an immigrant is back on the United States
immigration public pathway after CBI acquisition, the immigrant is still at
the whim of priority date backlogs for immigrant visas, as well as the
continuing viability of the Regional Center program. 200 In some respects,
CBI acquisition is just an accelerated binary, as the ideal situation is that the
immigrant has the capacity to meet the required investment level both for
the original citizenship by immigration and fifth preference classification,
with an E-2 visa giving the immigrant the important protection of entering
the United States legally before immigrant petition approval. 20
Regardless, the CBI bridge conceptually resembles a private
pathway, one whose major immigration-related step is done entirely outside
the public pathway of United States immigration law and with the extensive
assistance of both the private sector and another country's government. It is
telling that the employment-based immigration practitioner bar has resorted
to this level of private pathway innovation to balance a desire for easier
initial entry in nonimmigrant status with an immigrant investor's long-term
goals for stability, return, family resettlement, and future ease of
international travel.
Yet, this private pathway enables progression along the deficient
public pathway in United States immigration law. It uses the lower
threshold for the desirable binary (citizenship) in another country's public
pathway to compensate for this country's higher threshold. 2 02 In addition,
the assistance of another country's government in the CBI process can give
the immigrant's enterprise regulatory benefits in the form of access to other
sources of financial and human capital. 203 It can also, perhaps much to our
country's chagrin, result in loss of federal, state, and local business taxes
and licensing revenue during the enterprise's early stages. 20 4 Additionally,
any job creation or wage savings in the CBI country is not happening in
United States-based operations during the CBI enterprise's early stages
either. 205 On that final note, the CBI bridge serves as a potential spark for
creativity in the form of increased thought to the list of requested, or
desired, private actions or involvement when reforming the United States'
immigration public pathway.

199. Id. at 8-9.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 7.
202. See id. at 8.

203. See id. at 7-8.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 7 (observing that some CBI countries directly compete with the United
States for high-net-worth immigrant investors).
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CONCLUSION

Next steps for legislative and executive measures aimed at either
comprehensive or piecemeal immigration reform can hopefully use the
working definition of pathway derived from immigration law scholarship.
In so doing, such measures can build on this Article's element-driven
critiques of the potential pathways for immigrant entrepreneurs, small
business owners, and investors.
The mere presence of a range of nonimmigrant visa and immigrant
visa classifications options in the United States has not optimized pathways
for these immigrants. In some cases, the standards for these options as
written are incompatible with the realities of startups, small business, or
investment enterprises. 206 By other measures, the standards as applied
threaten the progression and protection essential to an immigration
pathway. 207
Element-driven solutions to reforms for these pathways abound.
Action-based reforms suggest making the entry point into the immigration
pathway more robust. Time and progression-based reforms suggest that
elusive legislative efforts to increase the available immigrant visas in
common categories for immigrant entrepreneurs, small business owners,
and investors are critical. They also suggest a potential new paradigm of
rewarding years of presence in a community and promoting gradual
progression rather than a sharp, sudden increase in investment amount of
job creation. They further suggest defining progression more inclusively, by
focusing at the local levels through business improvement districts,
opportunity zones, and by creating private-public partnerships aimed at
remedying past exclusion from entrepreneurial or business owner
progression of communities of color.
Direct investment in public works and infrastructure, parallel to
approaches taken by popular CBI countries, should also be considered.
Protection-based reforms should ensure that gain in business success does
not mean loss of immigrant eligibility. Changes in visa practices to make
international travel requirements more flexible, like the lengthy validity of
the E visa, as well as registration processes for employers or entities as
guards against agency error or inefficiency, would likewise ensure that the
accumulation of records does not go for naught and subsequent filings
instead focus on changes in circumstances.
The CBI example also suggests the potential benefits of greater
private sector integration in immigration pathways. Many progression
points already rely on private sector certification of sorts-everything from
mere attainment of degrees to accredited investor status by banks to
acceptance into a Regional Center investment vehicle. 208 Admittedly, large206. See id. at 8.
207. See id. at 9.
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scale private sector involvement can be dangerous, as fraud concerns in the
L-1A and fifth preference options illustrate in the employment-based
immigration world and as large-scale human rights crises, like immigrant
detention in private prisons, illustrate in the larger immigration scheme.
However, the employment-based immigration bar's private, optional
creativity should provide encouragement. Further requirements can be
implemented to seek the involvement of local economic development
groups and entrepreneur incubators in an employment-based immigration
world. The opportunity may even arise to take the persuasive lead of
Canadian private citizens who can individually sponsor refugees for
immigration status.
Lastly, the working definition of an immigration pathway could
have other applications outside of the immigration context. It could provide
a worthy lens to critique other federal programs that also fancy themselves
as public pathways. For example, the Small Business Administration's
("SBA") three flagship loan programs purport to meet fledgling enterprises'
financial needs at several stages. 209 The microloan program offers SBA
guarantees of loans up to $50,000.210 The 7(a) loan anticipates loan amounts
sufficient to purchase commercial real estate. 21' The 401 loan anticipates a
one-time purchase of large, expensive pieces of capital equipment.212 Its
public-private partnership, in which the individual applies to private entities
for funding while the SBA guarantees a loan to ensure a favorable term, can
be understood as a private pathway not unlike the CBI, albeit with potential
progression concerns regarding how effective the private sector network of
advisors is for the average SBA loan applicant.
In critically studying the lessons of employment-based
immigration's many attempts to create them for entrepreneurs, small
business owners, and investors; legal scholars, reformers, and immigrant
advocates alike can learn to keep the good and to discard the bad from the
complex system of nonimmigrant and immigrant status-a range of options
that theoretically could expand the binary thinking that still hinders
immigration pathway policy. An understanding of the potential for creative,
CBI-level private pathways can uniquely expose the progression deficits of
public ones.
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Administration 504/CDC Guaranty Program, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 7-8 (Updated Oct. 14,
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